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FOREWORD 
The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to 
control damage from debris in the Shuttle operational 
environment and to make the control measures a part of routine 
launch flows. These measures include engineering surveillance 
during vehicle processing and closeout operations, facility 
and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and 
photographic analysis of mission events. 
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch, 
on-orbit, and landing provide significant data in verifying 
proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In 
addition to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Photo/Video 
Analysis, reports from Johnson Space Center, Marshall Space 
Flight Center, and Rockwell International - Downey are also 
included in this document to provide an integrated assessment 
of STS-47.
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Shuttle Mission STS-46 was launched at 9:56 a.m. local 7/31/92
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1.0 
The pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle 
was conducted on 30 July 1992. The detailed walkdown of Launch 
Pad 39B and P-1 also included the primary flight elements 
OV-104 Atlantis (12th flight), ET-48 (LWT 41), and B1052 SP.B's. 
There were no vehicle or facility anomalies. 
The vehicle was cryoloaded for flight on 31 July 1992. There 
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 violations. 
There were no ice conditions outside of the established data 
base. The External Tank exhibited light condensate on the TPS 
acreage. The LH2 ET/ORB umbilical leak sensor detected no 
significant hydrogen during the cryoload. Droplets with vapor 
trails first appeared at T-4 hours 35 minutes and fell inter-
mittently until T-3 'hours. The cryogenic droplets may have been 
liquid air originating from the area of the 17-inch flapper 
valve torque' tool access port TPS plug closeout. No unusual 
vapors or additional droplets were visible from stable 
replenish through launch. Two cracks were present in the 
forward surface of the -Y ET/SRB vertical strut cable tray near 
the longeron closeout interface. There was no offset and no 
ice/frost in the cracks. The cracks occurred in an area where 
the stress relief cut had been eliminated by design at the 
factory. Based on a debris (loss of material) and aerothermal 
analysis, the condition was accepted for flight. 
A debris inspection of Pad 39B was performed after launch. No 
flight hardware was found. EPON shim material on the south 
1olddown posts was intact, but debonded. There was no visual 
indication of a stud hang-up on any of the south holddown 
posts. No frangible nut/ordnance fragments were found. The GH2 
vent line had latched properly. Damage to the facility overall 
was minimal. 
A total of 130 film and video items were analyzed as part of 
the post launch data review. No major vehicle damage or lost 
flight hardware was observed that would have affected the 
mission. The hydrogen burn 'Ignitor at the southeast corner of 
the LH2 TSM malfunctioned with a faster activation and a more 
concentrated stream of sparks than the other five ignitors. The 
ignitor burned 1.3 seconds (nominal burn time is 8 to, 12 
seconds) and was completely expended by SSME ignition (E-3, 19, 
20). Post launch analysis of the ignitor revealed a debond of 
the propellant from the inhibitor as the most likely cause of 
the malfunction. A stud hang-up occurred on HDP #7 (E-11). The 
stud remained fully extended as the aft skirt ascended. The 
stud pulled off three pieces of the EPON shim before dropping 
into the hoiddown post. No ordnance debris fell from any of the 
HDP DCS/stud holes. Orbiter performance, landing gear exten-
sion, wheel touchdown, and vehicle rollout after landing were 
normal.
The Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected at Hanger AF after 
retrieval. The RH frustum had 10 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners 
and one area of missing TPS, which measured 2.5"xl.5", near the 
381 ring frame between the +Y and +Z axes. The LH frustum was 
missing no TPS but had 12 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners. All 
Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were seated properly. 
A 3-inch diameter piece of the RDP #3 EPON shim was missing 
prior to water impact (sooted/charred substrate). The HDP #7 
stud hole was broached due to a stud hang-up at lift off as 
observed in the launch films. Small pieces of the EPON shim 
material adjacent to the stud hole had been pulled off by the 
stud. 
A detailed post, landing inspection of OV-104 (Atlantis) was 
conducted on 8 August 1992. The Orbiter TPS sustained a total 
of 236 hits, of which 22 had a major dimension of one inch or 
greater. .The Orbiter lower surface had a total of .186 hits, of 
which 11 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. Based on 
these numbers and comparison to statistics from previous 
missions of similar configuration, the total number of Orbiter 
TPS debris hits was greater than average and the number of hits 
one inch or larger was average. No flight hardware was found 
during the post landing runway inspection or under the ET/ORB 
LH2 and L02 umbilicals. All ORB/ET separation devices operated 
properly. 
A variety of residuals were present in the Orbiter window 
samples and indicated sources such as Orbiter TPS, 'SRB BSH 
exhaust residue, natural landing site products, organics, and 
paint. These data do not indicate a single source of damaging 
debris as all of the other materials have been previously 
documented in post-landing samples. The residual sample data 
also gave no indication of debris trends when compared to 
previous missions.	 . 
A total of three Post Launch Anomalies were observed during 
this mission assessment.
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2.0 PBS-LAUNCH BRIEFING 
The Ice/Frost/Debris Team briefing for launch activities was 
conducted on 30 July 1992 at 0830 hours with the following key 
personnel present: 
S. Higginbotham NASA - KSC STI, Ice/Debris Assessment 
B. Davis NASA - KSC STI, Ice/Debris Assessment 
G. Katnik NASA - KSC Lead, Ice/Debris/Photo Team 
B. Speece NASA - KSC Lead, ET Thermal Protection 
B. Bowen NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
K. Tenbuach NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
P. Rosado NASA - KSC Chief, ET Mechanical. Systems 
J. Rivera NASA - KSC Lead, ET Structures 
M. Bassignani NASA - KSC ET Processing, Debris Assess 
A. Oliu NASA - KSC ET Processing, Ice/Debris 
J. Cawby LSOC - SPC Supervisor, ET Mech Sys 
J. Blue LSOC - SPC ET Processing 
J. Kercamar LSOC - SPC ET Processing 
M. Wollam LSOC - SPC ET Processing 
W. Richards LSOC - SPC ET Processing 
M. Jaime LSOC - SPC ET Processing 
Z. Byrne NASA - JSC Level II Integration 
M. McBain MMC	 - MAF ET TPS Testing/Certif 
J. Stone RI	 - DNY Debris Assess, LVL II Integ 
K. Mayer RI	 - LSS Vehicle Integration 
J. Cook MTI	 - LSS SRM Processing 
R. Kretz MTI	 - LSS SRM Processing 
These personnel participated in various	 team activities, 
assisted	 in	 the collection	 and evaluation	 of	 data,	 and 
contributed to reports contained in this document.
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2.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PPD DEBRIS INSPECTION 
A pre-launch debris inspection of the pad and Shuttle vehicle 
was conducted on 30 July 1992 from 0930 - 1035 hours. The 
detailed walkdown of Launch Pad 39B and P-1 also included the 
primary flight elements OV-104 Atlantis (12th flight), ET-48 
(LWT 41), and B1052 SRB's. Documentary photographs were taken 
of facility anomalies, potential sources of vehicle damaging 
debris, and vehicle configuration changes. 
Due to the continued concern over potential hydrogen leakage 
from the ET/ORB LH2 umbilical interface area during cryo].oad 
and launch, tygon tubes for hydrogen leak detectors LD54 and 
LD55 were installed at the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. The tygon 
tubes are intended to remain in place during cryogenic loading 
and be removed by the Ice Team during the T-3 hour hold. 
There were no significant vehicle anomalies. 
Three MLP deck access plate bolts were loose. Small pieces of 
debris, such as tie-wraps, TPS trimmings, deck scale, and rust 
flakes, were scattered around the MLP deck. 
These discrepancies were corrected real-time by Pad Operations 
and no items were entered in S0007,. Appendix K. 
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LH (-Y) vertical strut/cable tray TPS covering prior to 
cryogenic fuel loading. Cracks have appeared in this general 
area after cryoload due to the elimination of a stress relief 
gap as part of a manufacturing process enhancement change. 
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LH2 ET/ORB umbilical, including aft pyrotechnic canister 
closeout and 17-inch flapper valve actuator access port foam 
plug closeout, prior to cryogenic fuel loading. 
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3.0 LAUNCH 
STS-46 was launched at 31:13:56:48 GMT (09:56:48 a.m. local) on 
31 July 1992. 
3.1 ICE/FROST INSPECTION 
The Ice/Frost Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was 
performed on 31 July 1992 from 0455 to 0635 hours during the 
two hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown. There 
were no Launch Commit Criteria, OMRS, or NSTS-08303 violations. 
There were no conditions outside of the established data base. 
Ambient weather conditions at the time of the inspection were: 
Temperature:	 74.8 F 
Relative Humidity: 	 93.8 % 
Wind Speed:	 5..7 Knots 
Wind Direction:	 215 Degrees 
The portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning 
radiometer was utilized to obtain surface temperature measure-
ments for an overall, thermal assessment of the vehicle, as 
shown in Figures . 1 and 2. 
3.2 ORBITER 
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed. All RCS 
thruster paper covers and water spray boiler plugs were intact. 
Less than usual ice/frost was present at the SSME heat shield-
to-nozzle interfaces. Condensate was present on all SSME heat 
shields and on base heat shield tiles. An infrared scan 
revealed no unusual temperature gradients on the base heat 
shield or engine mounted heat shields. No unusual vapors 
originated from inside the SSME nozzles. 
3.3 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
No SRB anomalies or loose ablator/cork were observed. The K5NA 
closeouts of the aft booster stiffener ring splice plates were 
intact. The STI portable infrared scanner recorded RH and LH 
SRB case surface temperatures between 75 and 78 degrees F. In 
comparison, temperatures measured by the hand-held Cyclops 
radiometer ranged from 74 to 78 degrees F and the GEl (Ground 
Environment Instrumentation) measured temperatures ranging from 
77 to 82 degrees F. All measured temperatures were above the 34 
degrees F minimum requirement. The predicted Propellant Mean 
Bulk Temperature (PMBT) supplied by MTI was 81 degrees F, which 
was within the required range of 44-86 degrees F. 
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3.4 
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run 
from 0200 to 0945 hours and the results tabulated in Figure 3. 
The program predicted condensate with no ice/frost accumulation 
on the-TPS acreage surfaces during cryoload. 
There was no ice/frost accumulation and light condensate on the 
L02 tank ogive and barrel sections. There were no TPS 
anomalies. The tumble valve cover was intact. The pressuriza-
tion line and support ramps were in nominal configuration. The 
STI measured surface temperatures that averaged 75 degrees F on 
the ogive and 73 degrees Fahrenheit on the barrel section. In 
comparison, the Cyclops radiometer measured temperatures that 
averaged 73 degrees F on the ogive and 69 degrees F on the 
barrel; SURFICE predicted temperatures of 66 degrees F on the 
ogive and 61 degrees F on the barrel. 
Some light run-off condensate was present on the intertank TPS. 
No frost spots appeared in the stringer valleys at either the 
LH2 and L02 tank-to-intertank flanges. No unusual vapors or ice 
formations were present on the ET umbilical carrier plate. The 
portable STI measured surface temperatures that averaged 75 
degrees F and the Cyclops radiometer measured temperatures that 
averaged 74 degrees F. 
There were no LH2 tank TPS acreage anomalies. Light condensate, 
but no ice or frost, was present on the acreage and aft dome. 
The portable STI measured surface temperatures that averaged 68 
degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 67 degrees F on the lower 
LH2 tank. In comparison, the Cyclops radiometer measured 
temperatures that averaged 67 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank 
and 68 degrees' F on the lower LH2 tank; SURFICE predicted 
temperatures of 54 degrees F on the upper LH2 tank and 67 
degrees F on the lower LH2 tank. 
There were no anomalies on the bipods, 'bipod jack pad' 
closeouts, PAL ramp, cable tray/press line ice/frost ramps, 
longerons, thrust struts, manhole covers, or aft dome apex. 
Some ice/frost was present in the ET/SRB cable tray-to-upper 
strut fairing expansion, joints. Ice/frost covered the lower EB 
fittings outboard to the strut pin hole with condensate on the 
rest of the fitting. The struts '
 were dry. Two cracks (8 and 4 
inches, respectively, and 1/4-inch wide) were present in the 
forward surface TPS covering of the -Y vertical strut cable 
tray near the longeron closeout interface. Both cracks 
exhibited no offset and were not filled with ice or frost. Due 
to the proximity of the cracks, the possibility existed for 
loss of BX-250 TPS in flight. Thermal and flow ,
 field analyses 
showed no aerothermal or debris concerns. 
Typical amounts of ice/frost were present in the L02 feedline 
bellows and support brackets.
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There were no TPS anomalies on the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. The 
purge barrier (baggie) was configured properly and was holding 
Positive purge pressure. There were no accumulations of 
ice/frost on the acreage areas of the umbilical. Formation of 
ice/frost on the separation bolt pyrotechnic canister purge 
vents was typical. Normal venting of nitrogen purge gas had 
occurred during tanking, stable replenish, and launch. 
Ice/frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both 
burst disks was typical. The LH2 feedline bellows were wet with 
condensate. 
Amounts of ice/frost on the top, aft, and inboard sides of the 
LH2 ET/ORB 'umbilica]. purge barrier were typical; and less than 
usual on the outboard side. Typical ice/frost fingers had 
formed on the pyro canister and plate gap purge vents. 
Ice/frost had also formed on the aft pyrotechnic canister 
bondline. Thin foam exists in this area due to an incorrect 
mold manufacture. The amount and location of the ice/frost was 
acceptable for launch per the NSTS-08303 criteria. No ice or 
frost had formed on the cable tray vent hole. Ice/frost 8"x4" 
had formed at the forward corner of the 17-inch flapper valve 
actuator access port foam plug closeout. A strong flow of purge 
gas vented from this area. The ice/frost formation was accept-
able for launch per the NSTS-08303 criteria. MPS evaluated the 
blowing purge gas leak and accepted the condition for flight. 
Droplets with vapor trails first appeared at T-4 hours 35 
minutes and dropped intermittently until T-3 hours. The 
cryogenic droplets may have been liquid air originating from 
the area of the TPS plug leak. No unusual vapors or additional 
droplets were visible from stable replenish through launch. 
The ET/ORB hydrogen detection sensor tygon tubing was in proper 
position prior to removal. The tubing was successfully removed 
from the vehicle. There was no flight hardware or TPS contact. 
The summary of Ice/Frost Team observations/ anomalies consisted 
of seven OTV recorded items: 
Anomaly 001 documented droplets with vapor trails falling from 
the area of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical and most likely was liquid 
air originating from the 17-inch flapper valve torque tool 
access port TPS plug closeout or nearby area. The foam plug 
exhibited a blowing purge gas leak with ice/frost formation at 
the forward corner. The ice/frost formation was acceptable per 
the .NSTS-08303 criteria. I'WS accepted the blowing purge gas 
condition as acceptable for launch. 
Anomaly 002 and PR ET-48-TS-0027 documented two cracks (8 and 4 
inches, respectively, and 1/4-inch wide) in the forward surface 
TPS covering of the -Y vertical strut cable tray near the 
longeron closeout interface. Both cracks exhibited no offset 
and were not filled with ice or frost. Due to the proximity of 
13
the cracks, the possibility existed for loss of BX-250 TPS in 
flight. Thermal and flow field analyses showed no aerothermal 
or debris concerns. 
Anomaly 003 recorded a 2-inch diameter ice/frost formation at 
the -Y vertical strut to ZT/SRB cable tray fairing aft side 
bondline. The condition was acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 004 recorded a 1-inch diameter ice/frost formation at 
the +Y vertical strut to ET/SRB cable tray fairing aft side at 
the vent/drain hole. The condition was acceptable per NSTS-
08303. 
Anomaly 005 documented ice/frost and froth spots at the LH2 
dome apex closeout bondline. The condition was acceptable for 
launch per the NSTS-08303 criteria. 
Anomaly 006 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations 
in the L02 feedline bellows and support brackets. These ice and 
frost formations were. acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
Anomaly 007 (documentation only) recorded ice/frost formations 
on the L02 umbilical purge vents and LH2 umbilical purge vents, 
purge barrier (baggie), and LH2 recirculation line bellows. The 
ice/frost formations were acceptable per NSTS-08303. 
3.5 FACILITY 
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and 
properly configured for launch. There was no debris on the MLP 
deck or in the SRB hoiddown post areas. 
No leaks were observed on either the L02 or LH2 Orbiter T-O 
umbilicals, though typical accumulations of ice/frost were 
present on the cryogenic lines and purge shrouds. There was 
also no apparent leakage anywhere on the GH2 vent line or GUCP. 
The GH2 vent line modification prevented ice from forming, but 
some ice/frost, which was expected, had accumulated on the GUC? 
legs and on the uninsulated parts of the umbilical carrier 
plate. 
Visual and infrared observations of the GOX seals confirmed no 
leakage. No ET nosecone/footprint damage was visible after the 
GOX vent hood was retracted. No icicles had formed on the GOX 
vent ducts.
14
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Light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulation, was present 
on the ET L02 tank ogive and barrel section TPS acreage 
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Light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulation, was present 
on the LH2 tank and aft dome TPS acreage 
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Typical amounts of ice/frost had formed in the L02 feedline 
support bracket and upper bellows 
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Two cracks, 8 and 4 inches long, respectively, appeared in the 
LH (-Y) vertical strut/cable tray forward facing TPS covering 
near the longeron closeout interface. A stress relief cut in 
the TPS to allow for structural movement had been deleted by 
design.
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Both cracks exhibited no offset and were not filled with ice or 
frost. Due to the proximity of the cracks, the possibility 
existed for loss of BX-250 TPS in flight. Thermal and flow 
field analyses showed no aerothermal or debris concerns. 
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Ice/frost formations on the inboard side of the LH2 ET/ORB 
umbilical/purge barrier, the lower plate gap purge vent, and in 
the LH2 recirculation line bellows were typical. Ice/frost 
accumulated on the thin foam and bondline around the aft pyro 
canister. Ice, 8"x4" in size, had formed at the forward corner 
of the 17-inch flapper valve actuator access port foam plug 
closeout. A strong flow of purge gas vented from this area. 
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Less than usual ice/frost had formed on the outboard and top 
sides of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical/purge barrier. Typical 
amounts of ice had accumulated on the upper plate gap and pyro 
canister purge vents, and in the LH2 recirculation line bellows 
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4.0 POST LAUNCH .PN) DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The post launch inspection of the MLP, FSS and Pad apron was 
conducted on 31 July 1992 from Launch + 2 to 4 1/2 hours. No 
flight hardware or TPS materials were found. 
EPON shim material was intact on all south holddown posts. 
However, the sidewall material was partially debonded on HDP #1 
and #5. There was no visual indication of a stud hang-up on any 
-of the south holddown posts. No ordnance fragments were found 
in the south BDP stud holes. All of the north HDP doghouse 
blast covers were in the closed position and exhibited less 
than normal erosion. The SRB aft skirt purge lines were in 
place but slightly damaged. The SRB T-O umbilicals exhibited 
minor damage including deformation of the sacrificial connector 
savers. 
The GOX vent arm, OAA, and TSM's showed the usual minor amount 
of damage. The GR2 vent line latched on the eighth tooth. 
There were no loose cables, but the north latch appeared to 
have contacted the north saddle stabilizer. The damage from 
this contact was minimal and has occurred on previous launches. 
Damage to the facility included: 
1. A broken light near the FSS 95 foot level elevator. 
2. A missing cable tray cover on the RSS 135 foot level. 
3. A door on an air regulator box on the FSS 155 foot 
level was open and bent. 
4. Apparent impact damage to the back of a GN2/GHe Service 
Panel pressure gauge on the FSS 155 foot level. 
5. An OIS box cover from the FSS 275 foot level was found 
on the FSS 255 foot level. 
All seven emergency egress slidewire baskets were secured on 
the FSS 195 foot level and sustained no launch damage. 
An inspection of the pad acreage, the flame trench, the beach 
from UCS-9 to the Titan complex, the beach road, the railroad 
tracks, and the water areas around the pad and under the flight 
path revealed no flight hardware or additional pad damage. 
MLP-1 was configured with overpressure sensors at the top of 
both TSM's, at the bottom of both SRB exhaust holes, and at the 
bottom of the SSME exhaust hole. All sensor readings were 
consistent with previous launches and within nominal limits. 
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Patrick AFB and MILA radars were configured in a mode for 
increased sensitivity for the purpose of observing any debris 
falling from the vehicle during ascent but after SRB separation 
(due to the masking effect of the SRB exhaust plume). Most of 
the signal registrations were very weak and often barely detec-
table, which generally compares with the types of particles 
detected on previous Shuttle flights. A total of 74 particles 
were imaged in the T+140 to 332 second time period. Thirty-
seven of the particles were imaged by only one radar,. 32 par-
ticles were imaged by two radars, and 5 particles were imaged 
by all three radars. Compared to STS-49, the number of detected 
particles was slightly larger but were within the same signal 
strength as most of the previous flights. 
Post launch pad inspection anomalies are listed in Section 9. 
23
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Plume erosion of the south SRB hoiddown posts was typical. EPON 
shim material was intact, but debonded along the sidewalls. 
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All of the north hoiddown post doghouse blast covers were 
in the closed position and showed less than usual erosion 
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5.0 FILM Ravi..w AND PROBLEM REPORTS 
Post Launch Anomalies observed in the Film Review were 
presented to the Mission Management Team, Shuttle managers, and 
vehicle systems engineers. These anomalies are listed in 
Section 9. 
5.1 LdWNCE FILM AND VIDEO 
A total of 106 film and video data items, which included 
thirty-seven videos, forty-six 16mm films, nineteen 35mm films, 
and four 70mm films, were reviewed starting on launch day. 
No major vehicle damage or lost flight hardware was observed 
that would have affected the mission. 
The hydrogen burn ignitor at the southeast corner of the LH2 
TSM malfunctioned with a faster activation and a more 
concentrated stream of sparks than the other five ignitors. The 
ignitor burned 1.3 seconds (nominal burn time is 8 to 12 
seconds) and was completely expended by SSME ignition (E-3, 19, 
20). Post launch analysis of the ignitor revealed a debond of 
the propellant from the inhibitor as the most likely cause of 
the malfunction. X-rays were taken of the remaining ignitors in 
this lot and examined for anomalies. In addition, a burst 
pressure test was performed on six expended ignitor casings. 
The welds on the ignitor end caps failed between 6500 to 7000 
psig. Mathematical analysis determined the worst case internal 
pressure based on a burn time of 1.3 seconds and 100 percent 
burning of the propellant surface area would be 3900 psig. The 
analysis concluded the ignitor casing would not fail during an 
abnormal propellant burn. 
SSME ignition, Mach diamond formation, and gimbal profile 
appeared normal. Numerous flashes and streaks occurred in the 
SS #1 and #2 Mach diamonds (OTV 170, 171, E-2, 3). Fore-aft 
movement of the base heat shield between the SSME cluster was 
visible during the early stages of SSME ignition (E-20, 76, 
77). This phenomenon has occurred on previous launches. 
SSME ignition caused numerous pieces of ice/frost to fall from 
the ET/Orbiter umbilicals. Some pieces were deflected by the 
umbilical cavity sill. No damage to Orbiter tiles or ET TPS was 
visible. Although some cryogenic drips with vapor trails were 
detected during tanking and stable replenish, there were no 
unusual vapors or cryogenic drips from the ET/ORB umbilicals 
during ignition and liftoff (OTV 109, 154, 163, 164). 
SSME ignition vibration and acoustics caused the loss of tile 
surface coating material from the aft surface of the RH RCS 
stinger (E-17, 19).
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Two dark objects passed by the vertical stabilizer moving left 
to right, but there was no apparent vehicle contact (OTV 170, 
171). A dark particle fell aft through the field of view past 
the lower, surface of the elevon. A second small particle moving 
in the same direction lightly contacted the body flap without 
causing tile damage (E-17, frame 3739). 
A flat, thin, triangular object (possibly cardboard) with a 
major dimension of 6 inches fell downward (frame 1820) through 
the field of view near the LH wingtip/LH SRB area (E-36). A 
dark object, probably originating from the facility, crossed 
the FOV from left to right at frame 4779, but did not contact 
the vehicle (E-40). A second dark object, which appeared to be 
a bird, first appeared near the -Y thrust strut and fell aft 
without contacting the vehicle (E-40, frame 5060). A facility 
debris particle, black on one side and light on the other side, 
fell past the LH SRB prior to liftoff (E-7, 30). This may have 
been the object observed in film item E-36. A debris particle, originating from the exhaust hole, fell below the elevon 
without contacting the vehicle (E-31). 
Light frost was present in the ET GOX vent louvers. There was 
no TPS damage to the ET nose cone acreage, footprint, or 
fairing (OTV 160, 161, 162). Vehicle "twang" as measured by the 
excursion of the ET pressure spike was, approximately 32 inches 
(E-79) 
A stud hang-up occurred on HDP #7 (E-11). The stud remained 
fully extended as the aft skirt ascended. The stud pulled off 
three pieces of the EPON shim before dropping into the holddown 
post. 
No ordnance debris fell from any of the HDP DCS/stud holes. 
The Orbiter LH2 and L02 T-0 umbilicals disconnected and 
retracted properly (OTV 149, 163). GTJCP disconnect from the 
External Tank was nominal (OTV 104)-. The GH2 vent arm retracted 
and latched properly with no rebound. There was no excessive 
slack in the static retract lanyard (E-33, 41, 42, 48, 50). 
A light colored, soft focused object first appeared (at the top 
of the frame) against the LH SRB case and fell aft along the -z 
side of the External Tank at 56:59.012 GMT in film item E-57. 
Review of film item E-59, which covers the forward part of the 
vehicle, did not show the object during this same time frame. 
The origin of the object has not yet been determined. 
Clusters of particles falling aft of the Orbiter after comple-
tion of the roll maneuver were ' traced to the forward RCS 
thrusters and were pieces of RCS paper covers. Other pieces of 
RCS paper covers were visible passing over the Orbiter wings 
(E-213, 222)
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Orange flashes occurred in the SSME plume during ascent 
(ET-207, 208, E-207, 212, 220, 222) 
Movement of the body flap was similar in amplitude and 
frequency to previous flights (E-207, 212, 220). 
Aft dome charring, plume recirculation, and SRB separation 
appeared normal (TV-4B, TV-13, ET-204, ET-207, ET-208, ET-212, 
E-207, 208, 212) . 
Frustum separation from the forward skirts, parachute deploy-
ment and reefing appeared normal. Nozzle severance debris was 
typical. Water splashdown was not visible (E-301, 302). 
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Normal initiation of hydrogen burn ignitor (top) compared to 
anomalous initiation of STS-46 ignitor (bottom) . This ignitor 
malfunctioned with a faster activation, more concentrated 
stream of sparks, and was completely expended in 1.3 seconds 
(nominal burn time is 8 to 12 seconds) 
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A stud hang-up occurred on HDP V. The stud remained fully 
extended as the aft skirt ascended. The stud pulled off three 
pieces of the EPON shim (arrow) before dropping into the 
hoiddown post.
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A light-colored, soft focused object first appeared against the 
LH SRB case and fell aft along the -z side of the External Tank 
at 56:59.012 GMT in film item E-57. The origin of the object 
had not been determine.
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5.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
OV-104 was not equipped to carry ET/ORB umbilical separation 
cameras. Flight crew hand held photography of the External Tank 
after separation from the 'Orbiter (DTO-0312) was not planned 
for this mission. However, two views of the -Y+Z side of the ET 
were obtained 12 minutes after separation from the Orbiter. 
There were no apparent anomalies on the L02 tank, intertank, 
LH2 tank, and aft dome acreage TPS. Bright spots' on the PAL 
ramp, bipods, pressurization line/cable tray ramps, -Y vertical 
strut, and EO-2 fitting were caused by 'reflected sunlight. 
5.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
A total of 24 film and video data items, which included nine 
videos, eight 16mm high - speed films, and seven 35mm large 
format films, were reviewed. 
Orbiter performance in the Heading Alignment Circle (HAC) and 
final approach appeared nominal. Main landing gear deployment 
and touchdown was normal. Nose rotation and touchdown of the 
nose landing gear was smooth. No vehicle anomalies or major 
tile damage was visible in these views. 
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Views of the External Tank 12 minutes after separation from the 
Orbiter showed no anomalies on the L02 tank, intertank, LH2 
tank, and aft dome TPS acreage. Bright spots on the PAL ramp, 
bipods, pressurization line/cable tray ramps, EO fitting, and 
LH vertical strut were caused by reflected sunlight.
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6.0 SRB POST FLIGHT/RETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT 
Both Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and 
debris sources at CCAFS Hangar AF on 3 August 1992 from 0800 to 
1000 hours. From a debris standpoint, both SRB'.s were in excel-
lent condition. 
6.1 RH SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The RR frustum had 10 MSA-2 debonds over fasteners and one area 
of missing TPS, which measured 2.5"xl.5", near the 381 ring 
frame between the +Y and +Z axes (Figure 4). Minor localized 
blistering of the Hypalon paint had occurred in isolated areas. 
All BSM aero heatshield covers were locked in the fully opened 
position. 
The RH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. Both 
RSS antennae were intact and undamaged. Minor blistering of the 
Hypalon paint occurred on the systems tunnel cover and forward 
ET/SRB attach point (Figure 5). No pins were missing from the 
frustum severance ring. The forward separation bolt and 
electrical cables appeared to have separated cleanly. 
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were 
generally in good condition. Minor trailing edge damage to the 
FJPS and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting 
from severance of the nozzle extension. 
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. The ET/SRB 
aft struts, ETA ring, lEA, and lEA covers appeared undamaged. 
No TPS was missing from the upper strut fairing. All three aft 
booster stiffener rings sustained water impact damage. The aft 
booster stiffener ring splice plate closeouts were intact and 
no K5NA material was missing. 
The phenolic material on the kick ring had delaminated. The 
K5NA closeouts (protective domes) on the kick ring forward and 
aft fasteners had been eliminated. RTV-133 replaced the K5NA 
over the forward fasteners. The aft fasteners were uncovered. 
The aft skirt acreage TPS was in good condition (Figure 6). 
All four Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers were properly 
seated. This was the ninth flight utilizing the optimized link. 
A 3-inch diameter piece of the HDP #3 EPON shim was missing 
prior to water impact (sooted/charred substrate) 
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The RH frustum had 10 MSA-2 deboiids over fasteners and one area 
of missing TPS near the 381 ring frame between the +Y and +Z 
axes. All BSM aero heat shield covers were locked in the fully 
opened position.
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The RH forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. Minor 
blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred in localized areas. 
Both RSS antenna covers/TPS were intact and undamaged. 
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Post flight condition of the SRM segment cases, factory joints, 
and field joint closeouts 
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Post flight condition of the RH aft booster. The aft skirt 
acreage TPS was sooted but in good condition. The ET/SRB aft 
struts, ETA ring, and lEA appeared undamaged. All three aft 
booster stiffener rings sustained water impact damage. 
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A 3-inch diameter piece of the HDP #3 EPON shim was missing 
prior to water impact (sooted/charred substrate) 
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6.2 LU SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER DEBRIS INSPECTION 
The LI! frustum was missing no TPS but had 12 MSA-2 debonds over 
fasteners. There was very minor localized blistering of the 
Hypalon paint in isolated areas. The BSM aero heatshield covers 
were locked in the fully opened position (Figure 7). 
The LI! forward skirt exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. The 
phenolic plates on both RSS antennae were intact. The forward 
separation bolt and electrical cables appeared to have 
separated cleanly. No pins were missing from the frustum 
severance ring. Minor blistering of the Hypalon paint occurred 
around the ET/SEB attach point (Figure 8). 
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) closeouts were 
generally in good condition. Minor trailing edge damage to the 
FJPS and the GEl cork runs were attributed to debris resulting 
from severance of the nozzle extension. 
Separation of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. A 2"xl" 
area of TPS was missing from the upper strut fairing and may 
have been lost during separation. The lEA, lEA covers, and all 
three aft booster stiffener rings sustained water impact 
damage. The aft booster stiffener ring splice plate closeouts 
were intact and no K5NA material was missing. 
The phenolic material on the kick ring had de].aminated. The 
K5NA closeouts (protective domes) on the forward and aft 
fasteners on the kick ring had been eliminated (Figure 9). 
RTV-133 replaced the K5NA over the forward fasteners. The aft 
fasteners were uncovered. The aft-skirt acreage TPS was in good 
condition. 
The ND? #7 stud hole was broached due to a stud hang-up at lift 
off as observed in the launch films. Small pieces of the EPON 
shim material adjacent to the stud hole had been pulled off by 
the stud. All four Debris Containment System (DCS) plungers 
were properly seated. This was the ninth flight utilizing the 
optimized link. None of the remaining EPON shim material was 
lost prior to water impact.
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The LH forward skirt exhibited no MSA-2 debonds or missing TPS. 
Both RSS antenna covers/TPS were intact and undamaged.
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Post flight condition of the SRM segment cases, factory joints,
and field joint closeouts 
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Close-in view of water impact damage to the ETA ring, lEA, and 
lEA covers. This type of damage was not a debris concern. 
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The HDP #7 stud hole was broached due to a stud hang-up at lift 
off. Small pieces of the EPON shim material adjacent to the 
stud hole had been pulled off by the stud. 
51
GRGiN..L ?AC: 
COLOR PHOTOGRAPH
6.3 RECOVERED 3RD DISASSEMBLY FINDINGS 
Post flight disassembly of the Debris Containment System (DCS) 
housings revealed an overall system retention of 99 percent and 
individual holddown post retention percentages as listed: 
% of Nut without % of Ordnance 
HDP # 2 large halves fragments % Overall 
1 99 95 99 
2 99 94 99 
3 99 99 99 
4 99 97 99 
5 99 98 99 
6 99 94 99 
7 99 96 99 
8 99 96 99
STS-46 was the ninth flight to utilize the new "optimized" 
frangible links in the holddown post DCS's. The link was 
designed to increase the DCS plunger velocity and improve the 
seating alignment while leaving the stud ejection velocity the 
same. The design was intended to prevent ordnance debris from 
falling out of the DCS yet not increase the likelihood of a 
stud hang-up. According to NSTS-07700, the Debris Containment 
System should retain a minimum of 90 percent of the ordnance 
debris. 
3RD Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 9. 
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7.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSNENT 
A post landing debris inspection of OV-104 (Atlantis) was 
conducted on 8-9 August 1992 at the Kennedy Space Center on 
Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) Runway 33 and in the Orbiter 
Processing Facility bay #2 to identify debris impact damage 
and, if possible, debris sources. The Orbiter TPS sustained a 
total of 236 hits, of which 22 had a major dimension of one 
inch or greater. This total does not include the numerous hits 
on the base heat shield attributed to SSME vibration/acoustics 
and exhaust plume recirculation. A comparison of these numbers 
to statistics from 33 previous missions of similar configura-
tion (excluding missions STS-23, 25, 26, 26R, 27R, 30R, and 42, 
which had damage from known debris sources), indicates that the 
total number of hits is greater than average and the number of 
hits one inch or larger is average. Figures 10-13 show the TPS 
debris damage assessment for STS-46. 
The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 186 hits, of 
which 11 had a major dimension of one inch or greater. 
Seventy-one hits, two of which had a major dimension of one 
inch or greater, were-clustered aft and inboard of the LH2 
ET/ORS (LR) umbilical. Similar clusters of hits have been 
observed in this area on previous flights and are attributed to 
ice/debris impacts during ET separation and/or damage from 
purge barrier baggie and ice during ascent.. The distribution of 
the remaining hits on the Orbiter lower surface does not point 
to a single source of ascent debris, but indicates a shedding 
of ice and Thermal Protection System (TPS) debris from random 
sources. 
The following table breaks down the STS-46 Orbiter debris 
damage by area: 
Lower surface 11 186 
Upper surface 0 8 
Right side 0 1 
Left	 side 0 1 
RBOMSPod 7 21 
LH OMS Pod 4 19 
TOTALS 22 236
No -TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels, 
tires, or brakes. The main landing gear tires were considered 
to be in excellent condition for a landing on the KSC runway. 
All ET/Orbiter (EO) separation ordnance devices appeared to 
have functioned properly. No flight hardware was found on the 
runway below the umbilicals when the ET doors were opened. 
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Figure 10. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
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Figure 11. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS 
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Figure 12. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
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Figure 13. DEBRIS DAMAGE LOCATIONS
Damage to the base heat shield tiles was typical. The SSME #1 
Dome Mounted Heat Shield (DIS) closeout blanket was tarn at 
the 6:00 o'clock position. The blanket on SS #2 was frayed 
from the 2:00 to 3:00 position. There was no apparent damage to 
the SS #1 nozzle insulation from the hydrogen ignitor anomaly 
during SSME ignition. 
There was no visible damage to the RCC nosecap or wing leading 
edge panels. 
Orbiter windows #3 and #4 exhibited moderate hazing with a few 
streaks. Hazing on the other windows was less than usual. 
Laboratory analysis will be performed on samples taken from the 
windows (reference Figure 14). Six damage sites were noted on 
the perimeter tiles around window #3. The impact sites were 
only surface coating 1ossesor were no more than 1/4 inch deep. 
This damage may have been caused by the RTV used to bond paper 
covers to the FRCS nozzles or by exhaust products from the SRB 
booster separation motors. 
Runway 33 was inspected and swept by KSC EG&G SLF personnel on 
7 August 1992 and all potentially damaging debris was removed. 
A post landing inspection of Runway 33 was performed 
immediately after landing. No debris or flight hardware was 
found. 
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) was used to measure the 
surface temperatures of three areas on the Orbiter TPS after 
landing (per OMRSD V09AJO.095). Twenty-two minutes after 
landing the Orbiter nosecap RCC was 194 degrees F, the RH wing 
leading edge RCC panel #9 was 139 degrees F, and panel #17 was 
129 degrees F (reference Figure 15). 
In summary, the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits was 
greater than average and the number of hits with a major dimen-
sion one inch or larger was average when compared to previous 
flights (reference Figures 16-18). 
Orbiter Post Launch Anomalies are listed in Section 9. 
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Figure 14. CHEMICAL SAMPLE LOCATIONS
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Figure 15. STS- 46 RCC TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS AS 
RECORDED BY THE SHUTTLE THERMAL IMAGER 
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FIGURE 16. ORBITER POSTFLIGHT DEBRIS DAMAGE SUMMARY 
LOWER SURFACE	
. ENTIRE VEHICLE 
HITS> 1 INCH TOTAL HITS HITS> 1 INCH TOTAL HITS 
STS-6 15 80 36 120 
STS-8 3 29 7 56 
STS-9 (41-A) 9 49 14	 . 58 
STS- 11(41-B) 11 19 34	 . 63 
STS-13 (41-C) .5 27 8 36 
STS-14 (41-D) 10 44 30 111 
STS- 17(41-G) 25 69 36 154 
STS-19 (51-A) 14 66 20 87 
STS-20 (51-C) 24 67 28 81 
STS-27 (51-1) 21 96 33 141 
STS-28 (51-J) 7 66 17 111 
STS-30 (61-A) 24 129 34 183 
STS-31 (61-B) 37 177 55 257. 
STS-32 (61-C) 20 134 39 193 
STS-29 18 100 23 132 
STS-28R 13 60 20 76 
STS-34 17 51 18 53 
STS-33R 21 107 21 118 
STS-32R 13 111 15 120 
STS-36 17 61 19 81 
STS-31R 13 47 14 63 
STS-41 13 64 16 76 
STS-38 7 70 8 81 
STS-35 15 132 17 147 
STS-37 7 91 10 113 
STS-39 14 217 16 238 
STS-40 23 153 25 197 
STS-43 24 122 25 131 
STS-48 14 100
.
25 182 
STS-44 6 74 9 101 
STS-45 18 122 22 172 
STS-49	 . 6 55 11 114 
STS-50 28 141 45 184 
AVERAGE 15.5 88.8 22.7 122.1 
SIGMA Z5 44.3 11.3 54.3 
$T$46 U 186k
MISSIONS STS-23,24,25,26,26R, 27R, 30R, AND 42 ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THIS ANALYSIS 
SINCE THESE MISSIONS HAD SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE CAUSED BYKNO WN DEBRIS SOURCES 
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OV-104 Atlantis landed on Runway 33 at the Kennedy Space Center 
Shuttle Landing Facility on 8 August 1992 
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Overall view of Orbiter left side
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Overall view of the L02 ET/ORB umbilical. All separation 
'	 ordnance devices appeared to have functioned properly. No 
flight hardware was found on the runway below the umbilical 
when the ET door was opened.
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Overall view of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical. All separation 
' ordnance devices appeared to have functioned properly. No 
flight hardware was found on the runway below the umbilical 
when the ET door was opened.
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Orbiter windows #3 and #4 exhibited moderate hazing with a few 
streaks. Hazing on the other windows was less than usual.
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8.0 DEBRIS SAMPLE LAB REPORTS 
A total of 9 samples were obtained from OV-104 (Atlantis) 
during the STS-45 post landing debris assessment at Kennedy 
Space Center (reference Figure 14). The nine submitted samples 
consisted of 8 window wipes (Windows 1-8) and 1 wipe from the 
Orbiter crew hatch window (Window 11) . The samples were 
analyzed by the NASA KSC Microchemical Analysis Branch (HAB) 
for material composition and comparison to known STS materials. 
Debris analysis involves the placing and correlating of 
particles with respect to composition, thermal (mission) 
effects, and availability. Debris sample results and analyses 
are listed by Orbiter location in the following summaries. 
Orbiter Windows 
Results of the window sample analysis revealed the presence of 
the following materials: 
1. Metallics 
2. RTV, silica tile, insulation 
3. Paints, salt, rust 
4. Organics and organic fibers 
5. Earth compounds 
Debris analysis provides the following correlations: 
1. Metallic particles (zinc, aluminum, stainless and 
carbon steel alloys) are common to SRB/BSM exhaust 
residue, but are not considered a debris concern in 
this quantity (micrometer) and have not generated a 
known debris effect. 
2. RTV, silica tile, and insulation originate from Orbiter 
thermal protection system (TPS). 
3. Paint is of flight hardware/facility/GSE origin;. salt 
is a naturally-occurring landing site product; rust is 
an SRB ESM exhaust residue. 
4. Organics are being analyzed by chemical fingerprint 
(Infrared Spectroscopy) method; results are pending. 
This detailed process is more difficult due to small 
sample quantity. Organic fibers appear to originate 
from the sample cloth used for sampling. 
5. Earth compounds (alpha-quartz, calcite, calcium-rich 
and silica-magnesium) originate from the landing site. 
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Orbiter Crew Hatch Window 
Results of the Orbiter crew hatch window sample indicated the 
presence of the following materials: 
1. Trace metallics 
2.RTV, silica tile, insulation 
3. Paint, rust, salt 
4. Earth compounds 
5..Organics and organic fibers 
Debris analysis provides the following correlations: 
1. Trace metallics (zinc, aluminum, stainless, and carbon 
steel alloys) are common to SRB BSM exhaust residue, 
but are not considered a debris concern in this 
quantity (micrometer) and have not generated a known 
debris effect. 
2. RTV, silica tile, and insulation originate from Orbiter 
thermal protection system (TPS). 
3. Paint is of flight hardware/facility/GSE origin; rust 
is an SRB BSM exhaust residue; salt is a naturally-
occurring landing site product. 
4. Earth compounds (alpha-quartz, calcite, calcium-rich, 
and silica-magnesium rich materials) originate from the 
landing site. 
5. Organics are being analyzed by chemical fingerprint 
(Infrared Spectroscopy) method; results are pending. 
Organic fibers appear to originate from the cloth used 
for sampling. 
Conclusions 
The STS-46 mission sustained Orbiter tile damage to a greater 
than average degree. The chemical analysis results from post 
flight samples did not point to a single source of damaging 
debris. 
Orbiter window samples provided evidence of SRB BSM exhaust, 
Orbiter TPS, Orbiter window polishing compound, landing site 
products, organics, and paint. Window polish residue and glass 
fibers, which are materials that have been previously detected, 
were not observed in this mission's chemical sampling results 
(reference Figure 19). 
The Orbiter crew hatch window sample results revealed SRB BSM 
exhaust residue, Orbiter TPS materials, landing site products, 
organics, and paint. This data is consistent with that observed 
in previous sampling (STS-33R, reference Figure 19). 
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9.0 POST LADNH ANOLIES 
Based on the debris inspections and film review, 3 Post Launch 
Anomalies were observed on the STS-46 mission assessment. 
9.1 LAUNCH PAD/FACILITY 
1. The hydrogen burn ignitor at the southeast corner of the LH2 
TSM malfunctioned. The ignitor burned 1.3 seconds (nominal burn 
time is 8-12 seconds) and was completely expended prior to SSME
 
ignition. 
9.2 EXTERNAL TANK 
1. PR ET-48-TS-0027 documented two cracks (8 and 4 inches, 
respectively, by 1/4-inch wide) in the forward surface BX-250 
TPS covering of the -Y vertical strut cable tray near the 
longeron closeout interface. Both cracks exhibited no offset 
and were not filled with ice or frost. Due to the proximity of 
the cracks, the possibility existed for loss of . TPS material in 
flight. Based on a debris (loss of material) and aerothermal 
analysis, the condition was accepted for flight. The cracks 
occurred in an area where the stress relief cut had been 
eliminated by design at the factory. ET project had determined 
that re-instating the stress relief crack would not be cost 
effective. CR SO41254C added documentation to the NSTS-08303 
Ice/Debris Inspection Criteria to accept for flight the 
presence of one crack without offset. More than one crack, or 
cracks with offset, would require an engineering evaluation 
prior to launch. 
9.3 SOLID ROT BOOSTERS 
1. A stud hang-up occurred on HDP V. The stud remained fully 
extended as the aft skirt ascended. The stud pulled off three 
pieces of the EPON shim before dropping into the hoiddown post. 
9.4 ORBITER 
1. No items.
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Appendix A. JSC Photographic Analysis Sununary 
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September 4, 1992 
The following Summary of Significant Events report is from the Johnson Space Center NSTS 
Photographic and Television Analysis Project, STS-46 Final Report, and was completed 
September 4, 1992. Publication numbers are LESC-30420 and JSC-25994-46. The actual 
document can be obtained through the LESC library/333-6594 or Christine Dailey /483-5336 
of the NSTS Photographic and Television Analysis Project. 
78
2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
2.1	 Debris 
2.1.1	 Debris near the Time of SSME Ignition 
2.1.1.1	 LH2 and L02 Umbilical Disconnect Debris 
(Ca,neras E-005, E-006, E-017, E-025, E-026, E-030, E-031, E-034, E-
057, E-079, OTV109, 0TV149, 0TV163, OTV170) 
Normal ice debris and vapors were noted falling from both the LH2 and L02 umbilical 
disconnect areas at SSME ignition through liftoff. On camera OTV 109, several small pieces of 
ice were noted striking the lower lip of the IM umbilical well area after SSME ignition. No 
vehicle damage was apparent. 
2.1.1.2	 TSM Debris 
(Cameras E-003, 0TV149, 0TV163) 
Normal ice debris and vapors were noted failing from both the LH2 and L02 umbilical TSM 
disconnect areas at liftoff. On camera OTV 163, a small piece of dark debris first seen near the 
LH2 TSM disconnect traveled up along the vehicle and out of the field of view at SSME 
ignition. On camera E-003, a rectangular piece of debris (shiny on one side) was seen moving 
from left to right in the field of view passing in front of the hydrogen TSM after SSME 
ignition. This debris did not appear to strike the vehicle. 
2.1.1.3 Debris near Right Elevon 
Two small dark pieces of debris were seen falling along the right elevon prior to liftoff. The 
debris did not appear to strike the vehicle. 
2.1.1.4 Debris near LSRB 
(Camera E-036) 
A triangular piece of dark debris was seen falling toward the base of LSRB from left to right 
across the field of view after SSME ignition. The debris did not appear to strike the vehicle. 
2.1.2	 Debris near the Time of SRB Ignition 
2.1.2.1	 SRB Flame Duct Debris (Task #7) 
(Cameras E-007, E-008, E-010, E-011, E-012, E-014, E-030, E-035) 
As on previous missions, several pieces of debris were noted originating from the SRB flame 
ducts near the hoiddown posts during and after SRB ignition. None of the debris was noted as 
fast moving. None of the debris was observed to strike the vehicle. 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
2.1.2.2	 Debris near Hoiddown Posts 
(Cameras E-007, E-OlI) 
Figure 2.1.2.2	 Debris near LSRB Holddown Post M-7 at Liftoff 
Three pieces of dark debris (probably epon shim material) were noted falling from the LSRB 
hoiddown post M-7 foot at the time of the bolt hang up at liftoff (shown above). 
A small piece of dark debris fell aft in the view of the RSRB M-4 hoiddown post (camera E-
007) at liftoff. The debris did not appear to be from the DCS. A different piece of dark debris 
appeared from behind the shoe on HDP M-4 and fell into the flame duct after liftoff. None of 
this debris appeared to strike the vehicle. No follow up analysis of the debris seen near the 
hoiddown post has been requested. 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
	
2.1.2.3	 Debris between LSRB and Left Wing (Camera E-026, E-040) 
A medium sized piece of dark debris was seen traveling from left to right between the LSRB 
and the left wing at liftoff on camera E-026. The same piece of dark debris appeared triangular 
shape and was seen to fall between the LSRB and the underside of the left wing tip on the 
mera E-040 film. The debris did not appear to strike the vehicle. 
	
2.1.2.4	 Debris near LH2 TSM Disconnect (Camera 0TV149) 
.\ tncJi urn-sized piece of dark rectangular debris was noted traveling upward from near the 
[112 l'SM disconnect area just after liftoff. This debris did not appear to strike the vehicle. 
	
1.2.5	 Debris between Orbiter Fuselage and Left Inboard Elevon 
(Camera F-031) 
Figure 2.1.2.5	 Debris between Orbiter Fuselage and Left Inboard 
Elevon 
A single piece of dark debris, first seen aft of the ET aft dome and between the SRBs, traveled 
between the Orbiter fuselage and the left inboard elevon at liftoff. The debris did not appear to 
strike the vehicle. 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
2.1.3	 Debris after Liftoff 
Multiple pieces of debris were seen falling aft of the SLY from liftoff through ascent on the 
launch tracking views. Most of the debris sightings were probably RCS paper or ice from the 
ET/Orbiter umbilicals. None of the below-mentioned debris seen after liftoff appeared to strike 
the vehicle. Debris falling aft of the SLY after liftoff has been seen on films and videos from 
previous missions. Most of this type of debris has been attributed to ice or RCS paper. No 
further analysis has been requested. 
2.1.3.1	 SLV Debris at Tower Clear through Roll Maneuver 
(Cameras E-057) 
Several pieces of white debris were seen falling from the ET/Orbiter umbilical area into SSME 
exhaust plume just after tower clear A small piece of white debris was seen moving past the 
vertical stabilizer and fall aft at T+7.7 seconds MET. 
2.1.3.2	 Debris near LSRB at 31.32 Seconds MET (Task #12) 
(Camera KTV4B) 
A single piece of light colored debris noted to the left of the LSRB was seen falling aft at 
approximately 31 seconds MET. This debris may have originated from the top of the SLY. 
Another single piece of light colored debris first noted behind the LSRB was seen falling aft 
along the SRB plume at approximately 32 seconds MET. 
2.1.3.3	 Debris near Right Wing at 39 Seconds MET 
(Camera E-222) 
A light colored piece of debris was seen coming from near the right wing and moved aft at 
approximately 39 seconds MET. 
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2.2	 MLP Events 
2.2.1	 Premature Firing of Hydrogen Igniter 
(Camera E-003, E-020))
Figure 2.2.1	 Premature Firing of Hydrogen Igniter 
The southwest hydrogen igniter on the LH2 TSM fired too fast and ended prematurely (before 
SSME startup). The southwest hydrogen igniter stopped firing at T-8.634 seconds as read 
from the Camera E-3 film. No follow-up analysis is expected. 
2.2.2	 Orange Vapor 
(Cameras OTV163, OP/i 70, OP/i 71) 
Orange vapor (possibly free-burning hydrogen) was noted beneath the body flap just prior to 
SSME ignition. This vapor appeared to be similar to that noted on previous missions. No 
further analysis has been requested. 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
2.2.3	 Apparent Excessive Motion of SSME #2 at Engine Start Up 
(Task #9) 
(Camera E-077, OTV171) 
The SSME #2 engine bell appeared to move more than SSME #1 or SSME #3 during engine 
startup when viewed on the Camera E-077 film (recorded at approximately 96 frames per 
second) and the OTV171 video. A study was requested to determine if there was above normal 
vibration in the STS-46 SSME #2 at engine startup. The apparent motion was compared to the 
STS-37 Camera E-077 film to determine if the motion is typical when viewed from the same 
perspective. STS-37 was also a morning launch from pad 39B on a 28.5 degree inclination. 
Data points for each mission camera on a series of frames on the same fixed point on the 
Mobile Launch Platform (MLP) and the same points along a major and minor axis on the 
SSME #2 bell were obtained. Calculations were made to determine the lengths of the axis for 
both the x and y directions. Analysis of measurements made from the two mission films 
indicated that there was no significant difference in the movement of SSME #2 on the two 
missions. 
Video cameras OTV171 from STS-46 and OTV071 from STS-40 (almost identical views) were 
also used in the analysis. Images were captured on the real time disk from STS-46 and STS-
40 and measurements were made on the engine bell motion. Again, no substantial difference in 
the SSME #2 motion was found. The largest relative change was in the major length for STS-
46 which was 8.5 inches as compared to 5 inches for STS-40 The relative change in the minor 
length was the same value - six inches. All other comparisons between missions produced 
identical values. The results of these measurements are presented in Section 6.0, Appendix C, 
Task #9. No follow up analysis is expected. 
2.2.4	 Flexing of Base Heat Shield

(Cameras E-076) 
A slight flexing was seen in the base heat shield after SSME ignition. Flexing of the base heat 
shield was first reported on STS-49 and was also found on several other previous missions 
views of the base heat shield when the films were rescreened. No follow up action has been 
requested. 
2.2.5	 Orange Discoloration in SSME Exhaust Plume 
(Cameras E-002, E-062, E-063, E-076, E-077, E-222) 
Orange discolorations were noted in the SSME #1, #2 and #3 plumes prior to and at liftoff. 
Nine discolorations in the SSME #2 mach diamond were timed on the camera E-222 film 
between T-1.835 seconds to T+0.532 seconds. The interval between the nine discolorations 
averaged 0.296 seconds with no noticeable frequency pattern. Two discolorations were seen 
in the SSME #1 mach diamond at T-0.148 seconds and T-0.742 seconds on the E-222 film. 
One discoloration was seen in the SSME #3 mach diamond at T-2.007 seconds. 
2.2.6	 Flashes in SSME Plumes after SSME Start Up. 
(Cameras E-001, E-0()2, E-003) 
On camera E-001, two orange colored flashes were noted in the SSME #2 exhaust plume prior 
to liftoff. On cameras E-002, E-003, two orange colored flashes were noted in the SSME #1 
plume while the vehicle was still on the launch pad. Events similar to these seen in the past 
were often found to be caused by RCS paper and other debris. Flashes in the SSME exhaust 
plumes at engine ignition have been seen on previous missions. No follow up analysis is 
expected. 
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2.2.7	 Base Heat Shield Erosion 
(Cameras E-017, E-019 and E-020) 
On camera E-020, slight base heat shield erosion was noted between the left OMS nozzle and 
the left RCS stinger. On camera E-017 and E-019, TPS erosion was noted on the tip of the 
right RCS stinger. TPS erosion on the base heat shield and RCS stingers has been seen on 
previous mission films. No follow up action has been requested. 
2.2.8	 LSRB HDP M-7 Bolt Hang-up 
(('ainera E-01 I) 
Figure 2.2.8	 Bolt Hang-up at LSRB HDP M-7 During Liftoff 
(Camera E-01 1) 
On camera E-Ol I a bolt hang up on the left SRB hoiddown post number M-7 was noted. The 
bolt hung up in the SRB debris containment system (DCS) area. The visible extent of the bolt 
hang up was measured to be 13.11 inches on the camera E-01 I film where the bolt appeared to 
be at maximum extension. A review of previous occurrences of bolt hang ups since reflight 
was conducted. Bolt hang ups have occurred on six previous missions since reflight. Five of 
the seven bolt hang ups were on the RSRB. No further photographic analysis is expected. 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
The missions where bolt hang ups have occurred are: 
MISSION LOCATION OF HANG-UP 
STS-34 RSRB hoiddown post M-2 
STS-33 RSRB hoiddown post M-3 
STS-39 RSRB hoiddown post M-1 
STS-43 I B hoiddown post M-7 
STS45 RSRB hoiddown post M-4 
STS-50 RSRB hoiddown post M-4 
STS-46 LSRB hoiddown post M-7
2.3	 Ascent Events 
2.3.1	 Flares in SSME Exhaust Plume 
(Cameras E-052, E-213, E-220, E-222, E-223, KTV21A, ET207, 
E7212) 
Multiple flares were seen in the SSME exhaust plume after liftoff on these long range tracking 
views. The flares were timed at 6.163, 14.890, 22.586, 27.872, 30.160, 34.322, and 36.992 
seconds MET on the cameras with digital timing. Flares during this time period have been seen 
on several earlier missions. No further analysis is expected. 
On cameras ET207, ET212, two flares were noted in the SSME plume: the first was at 
approximately 33 seconds MET and the second was at approximately 43 seconds MET. 
2.3.2	 Body Flap Motion (Task #4) 
(Cameras E-207,E -212, E-220, 0TV163)) 
Slight body flap motion was seen after the roll maneuver on these long range tracking camera 
views. Slight body flap motion was also seen prior to liftoff at T-2.2 seconds on Camera 
OTV 163. Body flap motion has been seen on previous mission films and the magnitude of the 
body flap motion seen on the STS-46 views is not sufficient to warrant further analysis. No 
follow up action is expected. 
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2.3.3	 Orange Puffs in SSME Exhaust Plume 
(Camera E-220) 
Figure 2.3.3	 Orange Puffs in SSME Exhaust Plume 
An orange puff was seen in the SSME exhaust plume at approximately 27.7 seconds MET and 
again at approximately 52.6 seconds MET (shown above) on the camera E-220 film. The 
cause of these puffs was not determined. No follow up action has been requested. 
2.3.4	 Orange Streak 
(Camera ET208) 
A bright orange linear streak was seen moving forward from the top of the left SRB exhaust 
plume to the SRB aft skirt area at approximately 87 seconds MET. This phenomenon was 
only seen in two frames and may have been caused by an atmospheric optical effect or a video 
distortion. No follow up action is expected. 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
2.3.5	 Recirculation (Task #1) 
(Cameras E7'204, E7'208, K7V13, E-204, E-208, E-212, E-218 and E-220) 
The recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the SLV prior to SRB 
separation has been seen on nearly all the previous missions. For STS-46, the start of 
recirculation was observed at about 96 seconds MET and the end was noted at approximately 
112 seconds MET on Camera KTV 13. See Appendix D for a summary of recirculation start 
and stop times for all missions since reflight. 
CAMERA START (seconds MET) STOP (seconds MET) 
ET204 - - 
*E'08 96 112 
KTV13 96 111 
E-204 - - 
E-208 97 107 
E-212 96 106 
E-218 - - 
E-220 - -
* BEST VIEW OF RECIRCULATION 
2.3.6	 Orange Pulse in SRB Plume before SRB Separation 
(Camera E7208) 
An orange pulse was seen in the SRB plume at approximately 113 seconds MET. This pulse 
was seen before the beginning of normal plume brightening. No follow up action is expected. 
2.4	 On Orbit 
2.4.1	 Tethered Satellite System (TSS) Support 
The STS-46 tethered satellite system (TSS) was recorded real time during both the satellite 
deploy and docking. No follow up video analysis support has been requested. 
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2.4.2	 Onboard Hasseiblad ET Analysis - DTO-312 (Task #6) 
Frame 46-71-03	 Frame 46-71-04 
Figure 2.4.2	 Photographs of External Tank After ET Separation 
The handheld hasselbiad ET separation photographs shown above were taken on STS-46 by 
Jeff Hoffman. The photographs were taken through the overhead window at 14:17:41 UTC 
or approximately 21 minutes after liftoff (12 minutes after ET separation). The views are of the 
Orbiter side of the ET and the aft dome. The external tank appeared to be in good condition 
with no visible divots or other anomalies. The bright spots seen on the L02 feedline, pal 
ramps, forward Orbiter attach bipod, and the aft Orbiter attach brace were caused by reflected 
sun light. 
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2.0	 Summary of Significant Events Analysis 
2.5	 Landing Events 
2.5.1	 Landing Sink Rate Analysis (Task #3) 
2.5.1.1	 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Film (Camera EL009, EL012) 
Camera EL009 film was used to determine the sink rate of the main gear. The right inboard tire 
was used to scale the measurements. Data was gathered for 2.146 seconds prior to landing 
through touchdown. Three points on every other frame over a period of 200 frames were 
digitized. These points consisted of the top and bottom of the right tire and a point on the 
runway immediately beneath the wheel. This raw data was corrected for the vertical change in 
scale at each frame. The distance between the bottom of the wheel and the runway was 
computed and a linear regression was applied on this normalized vertical distance vs. time data 
to find the actual sink rate. This rate was determined to be 2.6 ft/sec. which is well within the 
current threshold limits. 
Nose gear touchdown occurred approximately 15 seconds after main gear touchdown. Camera 
EL012 was used to determine the nose gear sink rate. The right inboard tire was used to scale 
the measurements. Data was gathered for the 2.083 seconds prior to nose gear touchdown. 
Four points on every other frame over a period of 100 frames were digitized. These points 
consisted of the bottom of the left nose wheel, a point on the runway surface immediately 
beneath the nose gear and the top and bottom of the right inboard maingear. This raw data 
was corrected for the vertical change in scale at each frame. The distance between the bottom 
of the wheel and the runway was computed and a linear regression was applied on this 
normalized vertical distance vs. time data to find the actual sink rate. This rate was determined 
to be 2.1 ft/sec. which is also well within the current threshold limits. 
Graphs depicting the above data can be seen in Task #3 Appendix D. 
2.5.1.2	 Landing Sink Rate Analysis Using Video (Camera KfV33) 
A single camera sink rate was calculated for the main gear of the vehicle using a single camera 
solution. Positional information was acquired by digitizing the landing sequence and then 
obtaining a screen dump of cursor positions at the points of interest. The positional 
information was then scaled to actual position and a linear least squares line was fitted through 
these points as a function of time. The main gear sink rate was calculated to be 1.3 feet per 
second and the nose gear sink rate was calculated to be 3.0 feet per second. A sink rate plot is 
located in Appendix D Task 3. No follow-up action has been requested. See Appendix D 
Task #3 for details. 
Results from the ifim analysis are considered better than video because of the higher spatial 
resolution. 
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2.6	 Other Normal Events 
Other events seen on the STS-46 launch views that have been seen on previous shuttle flights 
include: frost buildup around the ET/Orbiter umbilical baggy area and ET vent louvers; smoke 
from hydrogen ignitor startup; normal pad debris; RCS paper debris; white debris (probably 
ice) from the GUCP disconnect during liftoff; twang; slight vibration from the elevons at 
liftoff; MLP debris in the SLV exhaust plume after liftoff; ET aft dome outgassing and charring 
after liftoff; vapor off SRB stiffener rings after liftoff; condensation trails from the SLV after 
the roll maneuver, atmospheric bow waves (expansion waves); linear optical effect and SRB 
exhaust plume brightening at tail off. 
A water leak in a MLP J-pipe was seen prior to liftoff on cameras E-Ol 1, E-015, and E-016. 
STS-46 Final Report
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I.	 INTRODUCTION 
Space Shuttle Mission STS-46, the twelfth flight of the 
Orbiter Atlantis, was conducted July 31, 1992 at approximately 
8:56 A.M. Central Daylight Time from Launch Complex 39B 
(LC-39B), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. Extensive 
photographic and video coverage was provided and has been 
evaluated to determine proper operation of the ground and flight 
hardware. Cameras (video and cine) providing this coverage are 
located on the fixed service structure (FSS), mobile launch 
platform (MLP), LC-39B perimeter sites, onboard, and uprange and 
downrange tracking sites. 
II. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES: 
The planned engineering photographic and video analysis 
objectives for STS-46 included, but were not limited to the 
following.
a. Overall facility and Shuttle vehicle coverage for 
anomaly detection 
b. Verification of cameras, lighting and timing systems 
c. Determination of SRB PlC firing time and SRB 
separation time 
d. Verification of Thermal Protection System (TPS) 
integrity 
e. Correct operation of the following: 
1. Holddown post blast covers 
2. SSME ignition 
3. LH2 and L02 17" disconnects 
4. GH2 umbilical 
5. TSM carrier plate umbilicals 
6 • Free hydrogen \ignitors 
7. Vehicle clearances 
S. GH2 vent line retraction and latch back 
9. Vehicle motion 
There was one special test objective for this mission. 
a. DTO-0312, ET photography after separation 
III. CAMERA COVERAGE ASSESSMENT: 
Film was received from fifty-three of fifty-five 
requested cameras as well as video from twenty-two of twenty-
three requested cameras. The following table illustrates the 
camera data received at MSFC for STS-46.
CAMERA DATA RECEIVED FOR STS-46 
16mm 35mm 70mm Video 
MLP 22 0 0 3 
FSS 7 0 0 3 
Perimeter 3 4 0 5 
Tracking 0 14 0 11 
Onboard 2 0 1 0
Totals	 34	 18	 1	 22 
A detailed individual motion picture camera assessment is 
provided as Appendix B.. Appendix C contains detailed assessments 
of the video products received at MSFC. 
a. Ground Camera Coverage: 
Photographic coverage of STS-46 ranged from good to poor. 
Coverage from the trackers was limited due to an atmospheric 
haze. Cameras E-52, E-54 and TV-041 all did not run due to a 
tracker malfunction. 
b. Onboard Camera Assessment: 
A camera was flown on each SRB forward skirt to record the 
main parachute deployment. Both cameras operated properly, but 
did not record water impact. Also, the astronauts carried a 70mm 
hand-held camera to record film for evaluating the ET TPS 
integrity after ET separation.
 
IV. ANOMALIES/OBSERVATIONS: 
a. General Observations: 
While viewing the film, several events were noted which 
occur on most missions. These included: pad debris rising and 
falling as the vehicle lifts off; debris induced streaks in the 
SSME plume; ice falling from the 17" disconnect and umbilicals 
and debris particles falling aft of the vehicle during ascent, 
which consist of RCS motor covers, hydrogen fire detectors, purge 
barrier material and SRB thermal curtain tape. 
98 
b. SRB Holddown Post M-7 Stud Hang-up: 
Figure one is a frame of film taken from camera E-11 
showing holddown post M-7 stud hang-up. The stud appears to 
remain fully extended until the SRB aft skirt clears the extended 
holddown post stud. The stud also pulled loose several pieces of 
EPON shim material. 
c. Mach Diamond Color Change: 
Figure two is a film frame taken from camera E-77 showing 
the change in color of the mach diamond of SSME #2. After 
reviewing cameras E-213 and E-220; more information was required. 
Therefore, cameras E-76 and E-77 were requested. After viewing 
these films all three SSNE mach diamonds were observed to change 
orange in color. However, SSME #2 changed colors more 
frequently. 
V. ENGINEERING DATA RESULTS: 
a. T-Zero Times: 
T-Zero times were determined from cameras which view the 
SRB holddown posts numbers M-1, M-2, M-5 and M-6. These cameras 
record the explosive bolt combustion products. 
POST	 CAMERA POSITION 
M-1 E-9 
M-2 E-8 
M-5 E-12 
M-6 E-l3
b. ET Tip Deflection:
TIME (UTC) 
213:13:56:48.021 
213:13:56:48.020 
213:13:56:48.020 
213:13:56:48.020 
Maximum ET tip deflection for this mission was determined 
to be approximately 32.1 inches. Figure three is a data plot 
showing the measured motion o. the ET tip in both the horizontal 
and vertical directions. These data were derived from camera 
E-79.
c. SRB Separation Time: 
SRB separation time for STS-46 was determined to be 
213:13:58:53.52 UTC taken from camera E-208. 
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Space Transportation Systems Division 
Rockwell International Corporation
12214 Lakewood Boulevard
Downey, California 90241 
September 11, 1992
01% 
Rockwell 
International 
In Reply Refer to 92MA3 739 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
Houston, Texas 77058 
Attention: L. G. Williams (WA) 
Contract NAS9-18500, System Integration, Transmittal of the Rockwell 
Engineering Photographic Analysis Report for the STS-46 Mission. 
The System Integration Contractor hereby submits the Engineering 
Photographic Analysis Summary Report in accordance with the Space Shuttle 
Program Launch and Landing Photographic Engineering Evaluation Document 
(NSTS 08244) 
Extensive photographic and video coverage was provided and has been evaluated 
to determine ground and flight performance. Cameras (cine and video) 
providing this coverage are located on the Launch Complex 39B Fixed Service 
Structure (FSS), Mobile Launch Platform (MLP), various perimeter sites, and 
uprange and downrange tracking sites for the STS-46 launch conducted on 
July 31, 1992, at approximately 6:57 AM (PDT) from the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and for the landing on August 8, 1992 at KSC (6:12 AM PDT). 
Rockwell received launch films from 81 cameras (59 cine, 22 video) and landing 
films from 24 cameras (16 cine, 8 video) to support the STS-46 photographic 
evaluation effort. Two films, E-52 and E-54, were not available due to camera 
malfunctions.
/ 
All ground camera coverage for this mission including coverage on the MLP, 
FSS and tracking cameras were good. 
Overall, the films showed STS-46 to be a clean flight. Several pieces of ice from 
the ET/ORB umbilicals were shaken loose at SSME ignition, but no damage to 
the Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS) was apparent. The usual 
condensation and water vapors were seen at the ET aft dome and the SRB 
stiffener rings and dissipated after the completion of the roll maneuver. No 
vapor was observed in the vicinity of the rudder/speed brake at liftoff. Charring 
of the ET aft dome and recirôulationand brightening of the SRB plumes were 
visible and normal. Booster Separation Motor (BSM) firing and SRB separation 
also appeared to be normal. 
A disturbance in the lateral acceleration strip chart data at liftoff led Rockwell 
Engineers (Ascent Separation Systems) to suspect there had been a bolt hang-up 
on one of the SRB hoiddown support posts. This assumption was confirmed 
when film E-11 was reviewed which clearly showed the post M-7 bolt to hang-up 
at liftoff. 
(Packing Sheet NO. DM92-18968)
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Nominal performance was seen for the MLP and FSS hardware. FSS deluge 
water was activated prior to SSME ignition and the MLP rainbirds were 
activated at approximately 1 second Mission Elapsed Time (MET), as is normal. 
All blast deflection shields closed prior to direct SRB exhaust plume 
impingement. Both TSM umbilicals released and retracted as designed. The ET 
GH2 vent line carrier dropped normally and latched securely with no rebound. 
No anomalies were identified with the ET/ORB LH2 umbilical hydrogen 
dispersal system hardware. 
STS-46 was the ninth flight with the optimized attach link in the SRB holddown 
support post Debris Containment Systems (DCS's). The link is designed to 
increase the plunger velocity and seating accuracy, while leaving the hoiddown 
bolt ejection velocity unchanged. This prevents frangible nut fragments and/or 
NSI cartridges from falling from the DCS, while not increasing the probability of 
a holddown bolt hang-up. Significant events that were seen include a bolt hang-
up at hoiddown post M-7 of the left SEB at liftoff and the southwest hydrogen 
burnoff ignitor on the LH2 TSM which was expended early. These events and 
other events noted by the Rockwell film/video users during the review and 
analysis of the STS-46 photographic items are summarized in the following 
comments. These events are not considered to be a constraint to next flight. 
COMMENTS 
1. A hangup of the hoiddown post M-7 hoiddown bolt on the left SRB was seen 
at liftoff on camera E-11. Rockwell/Downey engineers had previously 
reported a disturbance in the lateral acceleration strip chart data at liftoff 
which led them to suspect a possible holddown post bolt hangup. Bolt 
hangups have occurred on previous flights since return to flight. A review 
of the previous bolt hangups shows the five bolt hangups occurred on the 
right SRB on STS-34 (Post M-2), STS-33 (Post M-3), STS-39 (Post M-1), STS-48 
(Post M-4), STS-50 (Post M-4) and two on the left SRB on STS-43 (post M-7) 
and STS-46 (Post M-7). No further analysis is planned. 
2. On Cameras E-3 and E-20, the Southwest hydrogen burnoff ignitor on the 
LH2 TSM was observed to stop firing prior to SSME startup. The hydrogen 
burnoff ignitors are designed to fire from prior to SSME startup to liftoff in 
order to burn off any excess hydrogen which may have collected under the 
SSME nozzle. However\this ignitor fired its entire load (solid propellant 
grain containing zirconium
\
) prior to SSME ignition. No follow-up action is 
planned. 
3. Three pieces of debris (probably EPON shim material) were noted falling 
from the SRB foot on camera E-11. This was probably caused by the M-7 bolt 
hang-up. No further analysis is planned. 
4. Orange vapor (possibly free burning hydrogen) was seen beneath the body 
flap just prior to SSME ignition on camera's OTV-1 63, OTV-1 70, and OTV- 
171. This vapor appears to be similar to the vapor noted on previous 
missions. It is not an issue and no follow-up action is planned. 
'5. On cameras E-36 and E-40, a flat triangular piece of dark debris seen failing 
through the field of view from left to right near the left wing tip toward the 
left SRB after SSME ignition. Does not appear to contact the vehicle. No 
further analysis planned.
104
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6. Flexing (fore and aft motion) was noted in the base heat shield in the 
centerline area between the SSME cluster during the early stage of SSME 
ignition (camera E-76). Base heat shield movement has occurred on 
previous missions and no follow-up action is planned. 
7. Orange flares and flashes seen in the SSME plumes (ET-207, ET-212, E-2, E-
3, E-52, E-207, E-212, E-213, E-220, E-222, E-223). These observations are seen 
frequently and are understood to be burning of propellant impurities 
including RCS paper covers. No follow-up action is planned. 
8. The following events have been reported on previous missions and observed 
on STS-46. These are not of major concern, but are documented here for 
information only: 
• Ice debris falling from the ET/Orbiter Umbilical disconnect area. 
• Debris (Pad, insta-foam, water trough) in the holddown post areas 
and MLP. 
• Butcher paper falling from the RCS. 
• Recirculation or expansion of burning gases at the aft end of the SLV 
prior to SRB separation. 
• Slight TPS erosion on the base heat shield during SSME start-up. 
• Debris pieces in the SSMEISRB plumes. 
• Condensation around the SLV after the roll maneuver. 
• ET aft dome outgassing and charring. 
• Slight elevon motion at SSME ignition. 
• Twang motion. 
• Body flap motion during the maximum dynamic pressure (MAX-Q) 
region which appeared to have an amplitude and frequency similar to 
those of previous missions. 
• Linear optical distortion, possibly caused by shock waves or ambient 
meteorological conditions near the vehicle, during ascent. 
9. Cameras E33 and E41 - OMRSD File IX Vol.5, Requirement No. DV08P.01 0 
requires an analysis of launch pad film data to verify that the initial ascent 
clearance separation between the left $RB outer mold line and the falling ET 
vent umbilical structure does not violate the acceptable margin of safety. 
A qualitative assessment has been conducted conduct and positive clearances 
between the left SRB and the ET vent umbilical have been verified. The films 
showed nominal launch pad hardware performance, and no anomalies 
were observed for the SRB body trajectory. 
10. Cameras E7-16 and E27-E28 - OMRSD File IX Vol. 5, Requirement No. 
DV08P.020 requires an analysis/6f film data of SRM nozzle during liftoff to 
verify nozzle to hoiddown post,drift clearance. 
/ 
A qualitative assessment of,1the launch films has been completed. No 
anomalies were observed for the SRM nozzle trajectory and positive 
clearances between the SRB nozzles and the holddown posts were verified. 
11. The landing of STS-46 occurred on runway 33 at the KSC Shuttle landing 
facility. Good video and film coverage were obtained and no anomalous 
events were observed. 
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